The Trust Indenture Act of 1939: Limitations on the Trustee\u27s Privilege of Lending to the Obligor by Editors, Law Review
NOTES
certificates were not negotiable. The fluidity of share certificates within the
brokerage system depends not upon negotiability, but upon confidence between
brokers. It is at the point where a certificate enters brokerage or banking chan-
nels that negotiability has its greatest significance. Negotiability at that point
serves to protect careless brokers and bankers who introduce certificates into
the brokerage system without confirming the registered owner's authorization
to transfer the shares. This protection is at the expense of private investors,
who as a class, cannot protect themselves with the ease or effectiveness that
brokers can.
THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939: LIMITATIONS ON THE
TRUSTEE'S PRIVILEGE OF LENDING TO THE OBLIGOR
Most trust companies which serve as trustees for indenture security issues
are also commercial bankers making short-term loans., It may happen, there-
fore, that such companies will occupy the dual position of indenture trustee and
creditor of the obligor on the indenture securities. As trustee, the trust com-
pany's duty to the bondholders requires that it refrain from any action which
may diminish the value of the property available to the indenture security hold-
ers to satisfy the indenture lien or claim; as a bank creditor, the trust company's
duty to its depositors and stockholders compel it, in conformity with sound
banking practice, to make itself whole on any outstanding loans to the obligor.
Because of the risk that such a trustee-creditor may disregard its fiduciary
duties to the investor, the Trust Indenture Act of 19392 requires a qualified in-
denture to contain certain provisions3 which protect the indenture security
holder against the trustee's improving its position as creditor within four months
of default on the indenture obligation.4
Prior to the Trust Indenture Act, there were but few suits to compel a cor-
porate trustee to share with investors any preferential payments which were
made by the obligor on debts to the trustee and which were received by the
x For example, see SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, pt. VI, Trustees under
Indentures, at 99 (1936). Of 3o8 corporate trustees, the commission found 240 were also com-
mercial bankers.
2 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), i5 U.S.C.A. § 77aaa (Supp. 1939).
3 The commission will refuse to allow a registration statement for the sale of indenture se-
curities to become effective if the indenture does not contain the provisions required by Sec-
tions 310 to 318 inclusive, § 3o5(b)(2). Section references are to the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, which is title III of the Securities Act of 1933.
4 §§ 311, 313(a)(2), (s), 313(b)(2). A "default," except where the trustee acts as trustee for
two or more qualified indentures, is defined as "any failure to make payment in full of principal
or interest, when and as the same becomes due and payable" by the terms of the indenture,
§ 311(a).
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trustee shortly before default on the indenture.5 Where recovery was granted,
the trustees were required to share the property received pro rata with the secur-
ity holders.6 Recovery in these few cases, however, seems to have been limited
to those situations where it was shown that the trustee either knew the obligor
was insolvent,7 had defaulted,' or permitted the violation of a "negative
pledge"9 or substitution clause.Io The difficulty confronting the security hold-
ers in getting judgment is apparent. They usually lack any information that the
trustee has made loans to the obligor or has protected itself as creditor before
default. Even if the security holders have this iiformation, however, they still
have the burden of proving that the trustee in making a secured loan or in bet-
tering its position knew that the obligor was insolvent or had defaulted or was
violating a negative pledge or substitution clause.II
I
The investor in indenture securities qualified under the act will be better in-
formed of the trustee's lending to the obligor. In this respect, a qualified inden-
ture must require that the trustee submit, at least annually, reports of any un-
s Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 450, 102 AtI. 844 (1917); Chase Nat'l Bank
of City of New York v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y. Supp. 487 (S.Ct. 1931); Kaplan v. Chase Nat'l Bank
of City of New York, 156 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y. Supp. 825 (S.Ct. 1934); Drueding v. Trades-
mens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 319 Pa. 144, 179 AtI. 229 (1935); Starr v. Chase Nat'l Bank of
City of New York, N.Y.L.J. 771-2, Sept. 21, 1936 (N.Y. S. Ct.), noted in 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
346 (I937); cf. Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y.
Supp. 54i (S. Ct. 1936).
6 Kaplan v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, i56 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y. Supp. 825
(S. Ct. 1934); Starr v. Chase Natl Bank of City of New York, N.Y.L.J. 771-2, Sept. 21, 1936
(N.Y. S. Ct.).
7 See Drueding v. Tradesmens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 319 Pa. 144, 179 Ati. 229 (1935).
8 Starr v. Chase Natl Bank of City of New York, N.Y.L.J. 771-2, Sept. 21, 1936 (N.Y.
S. Ct.).
9 Kaplan v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, i56 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y. Supp. 825
(S. Ct. '934); see Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., ii F. Supp. 497, 509 (N.Y.
1935).
For discussion of negative pledge clauses, see Jacob, The Effect of Provision for Ratable
Protection of Debenture Holders in Case of Subsequent Mortgage, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1938);
Protection for Debenture Holders, 46 Yale L. J. 97 (1936).
'o See Richardson v. Union Mortgage Co., 210 Iowa 346, 228 N.W. io3 (1929); Hazzard v.
Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, i59 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (S. Ct. 1936).
ix See Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y. Supp. 487 (S. Ct. 1931)
(where it was held that transferring of securities purchased with proceeds of loan was intended
as a purchase money mortgage, which is an exception to the negative pledge clause); Hazzard
v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (S. Ct. 1936)
(where although the trustee negligently permitted a substitution of assests relief was denied
because of exculpatory clause releasing the trustee from liability for all acts except those dolie
in willful default or in gross negligence. The Trust Indenture Act prohibits exculpatory clauses
which release the trustee from liability for its "own negligent action, its own negligent failure
to act, or its own willful misconduct. .. . ,. § 315(d)).
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paid advances-totaling more than one-half of one per cent of the outstanding
principal obligation-which it has made as trustee and for the reimbursement
of which it may or does claim a prior lien on the trust property. 2 In addition, if
such unpaid advances total more than ten per cent of the outstanding principal,
then, as to further advances of this type, interim reports will be necessary. 3
With reference to these provisions of the act, it should be observed that the
courts, in a few cases before the act, held that a trustee who failed to notify the
bondholders of advances for which it claims priority over the indenture lien,
will be denied priority.'4 Under the act a qualified indenture will, in addition to
the information concerning advances made in its trustee capacity, require that
the trustee's report convey such more important information as "the amount,
interest rate, maturing date of all other indebtedness owing to it in its individual
capacity," with a brief description of the collateral.s The ordinary loans to the
obligor made by the trustee as a commercial bank will fall into this class. For
this type of notice requirement there appears to be no common law precedent.
The provisions dealing with reports of the trustee-creditor relationship are
supplemented by those requiring notice of substitution and release of property
held under the indenture and those requiring that the obligor furnish to the
trustee opinions of an expert that the substitution or release will not impair the
value of the property under the indenture.'6 These provisions were meant to
protect the indenture security holders against a substitution or release which
will result in a reduction in value of the assets securing their claims. Concern
may be expressed, however, over the adequacy of protection given by such
notice of releases and substitutions in view of the fact that it is not necessary
that the obligor furnish independent opinions until the releases in any year
amount to ten per cent of the outstanding principal, and then only as to such
releases in which the property involved has a fairvalue in excess of $25,00o or one
per cent of the outstanding principal.7
II
Besides those provisions which relate to the disclosing of the status of the
trustee as a creditor, a qualified indenture will contain clauses providing for the
relief to be obtained by the investor from the trustee who improves its creditor
12 § 313(a)(2).
'3 This report must be given within ninety days of occurrence of the advance, § 313(b)(2).
'4 Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Investment Co., 213 Wis. 415, 25o N.W. 862 (933),
noted in 47 Harv. L. Rev. 882 (1934); Wright v. Chandler, x8o Ill. App. 476 (1913). Contra:
First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v. Ricketts, 75 F. (2d) 309 (C.C.A. 8th i934).
's § 313(a)(3). x6 §§ 313(a)(5), 31 3 (b)(i), 314(d)(I), (3).
'i § 314(d)(I). § 314(d)(3) also requires an independent opinion as to the fair value of any
property other than the original security to be subjected to the lien of the indenture if, (a)
the property was used within six months for similar business purposes to those contemplated by
the obligor, and (b) the fair value of the property to the obligor is not less than $25,ooo and
not less than one per cent of the principal outstanding.
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position or gives a secured loan to the obligor within four months of default.,8
The argument for such relief is illustrated by the Hoe 9 and Cuba Cane2° case
histories compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In the Hoe case the trustee for the bondholders became a secured short-
term creditor of the obligor in 1926. Two years later, as a result of modification
in the short-term loan agreement, the collateral ratio for the obligor's debt to
the trustee was increased with the privilege in the obligor, however, of with-
drawing any excess collateral. On March 17, 1932, the same day on which the
Hoe directorate voted to default on the bond interest payment falling due April
i, 1932, the loan agreement was altered so that the Hoe company would not be
able to withdraw the excess of $285,000 over the required collateral ratio.
In the Cuba Cane case, the trustee for Cuba Cane's debenture issue maturing
January 1, 1930, in co-operation with other banks, had extended seasonal credit
to the obligor. In November, 1928, with the bottom falling out of the sugar
market, the banks required as consideration for any extension of credit that
their old loans be secured. As a result, trade acceptances and securities were
given as collateral. In June, 1929, the trustee and another bank acquired for an
independent loan a second lien on this same collateral. During the same month
a readjustment was deemed necessary to avoid default on the debenture issue
which would mature less than seven months thereafter. After a reorganization
which was effected a few months later, the trustee and other banks continued
lending money to the new Cuban Cane Products Company. In I93o, the banks,
including the trustee, obtained a mortgage on Cuban Cane property and assets
to secure their claim. Later, in 1931, in order further to secure these loans a
wholly owned Cuban Cane subsidiary mortgaged its principal free assets which
otherwise would have been available to satisfy the debenture securities. The
trustee however, did not resign until December, 1932, eight months after fore-
closure proceedings were begun by the banks on the former mortgage.
To lessen the risk of losses to investors as illustrated by the Hoe and Cuba
Cane examples,"2 the act requires a qualified indenture to state that the trustee
holds in a "special account," to be shared with the security holders, any col-
lateral or payment given the trustee by the obligor within four months of de-
is § 311.
X9 SEC, op. cit. supra note i, pt. VI, at 83-8.
20 SEC, op. cit. supra note i, pt.VI, at 88-98. Another SEC case historyis that of the Frye In-
vestment Co. published in H.R. Hearing on H.R. 2191 and H.R. 5220, 76th Cong., ist Sess.
249-51 (1939).
2"See Comments by the Guaranty Trust Co. of New York on Certain Features of the Re-
port of Securities and Exchange Commission on Trustees under Indentures 39, 70 (1937) where
it is maintained the losses suffered by the security holders in the Cuba Cane and Hoe cases
were caused by general economic conditions. See also H.R. Hearing on H.R. 2191 and H.R.
5220, 76th Cong., ist Sess. 249 (i939) (Mr. Burke of the SEC admits that apparently the ma-
nipulations in the Hoe case did not cause any loss to the investors).
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fault.- Apportionment of this "special account" according to the formula set
by the act will ordinarily result in a prorating of the "special account" between
the trustee and investors, as was done in a few cases before the act. 23 But since
the trustee will be automatically accountable for many preferential transfers
made to it within the four-month period, the necessary requirements for re-
covery before the act are somewhat lessened for it no longer will have to be
shown that there was a negative pledge or substitution clause violation or that
the trustee knew the obligor was insolvent or had defaulted.24 It is important
to notice, however, that the provisions for relief, required by the act, are the
same for all qualified indentures, whether the indenture claim is secured by
specific property or is merely a general claim against the obligor. This uniform
requirement for all indentures should be compared with the provisions in the
original drafts of the act largely prohibiting debenture 6 trustees from being a
creditor of the obligor, or, if such trustees nevertheless lent to the obligor, giv-
ing the debenture holders a priority as to any assets these trustees obtained in
bettering their creditor position within four months of default.27
One of the reasons for these provisions in the original draft is found in another
type of incident disclosed in the Cuba Cane history.1 In this instance, Cuba
Cane had issued debentures in 1920 with a negative pledge clause binding it
not to mortgage its property except to acquire additional property or to renew
existing liens. In order to get credit in 1921 from a group of banks, which in-
cluded the trustee, it became necessary, however, for Cuba Cane to promise
that bonds would be issued to pay off the bank loans. Between 192o and 1922,
this promise was fulfilled by the transfer from one wholly owned subsidiary to
another of property obtained with the proceeds of the debenture issue. The
recipient subsidiary was then able to market a mortgage bond issue in 1922 se-
cured by the transferred property. With the proceeds from the sale of these
bonds the debenture trustee and other banks were paid on their short-term
loans.
Because of strong objection, however, the provisions prohibiting debenture
trustee loans were deleted.29 It was argued that to prohibit such trustees from
22 § 311(a). 24 P. 524 supra.
23 § 311(a); cases cited in note 6 supra. 2S S. 2344, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (I937).
,6 "Debenture" is used here to mean a security which is an unsecured credit claim against
the obligor.
27 S. 2344, 75th Cong., ist Sess. §§ 7(b)(6), 7(c) (1937). Trustees of issues having a matu-
rity period of less than five years were likewise prohibited from lending to the obligor. Prob-
ably a reason for this latter prohibition and penalty was that it was felt that, because of the
short duration of such securities, any short-term loans by the trustee were in direct competition
with the indenture loan.
28 SEC, op. cit. supra note i, pt. VI, at 98.
29 S. Hearing on S. 2344, 75th Cong., ist Sess, 89, 91, 1ig, 130, 133, 158 (i937). The similar
provisions as to trustees of issues of less than five years' maturity were also criticized and
dropped from the bill.
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lending to the obligor was to deprive trust companies of a needed source of
business.3° As for the investor, it was said that to penalize a trustee-creditor by
requiring it to share "preferences" with the security holders was sufficient pro-
tection.3' Besides, the critics maintained that the trustee's lending operated to
the security holder's benefit since the trustee is more concerned with the wel-
fare of the obligor than is an ordinary bank creditor.3'
The arguments given for removing the prohibition against debenture trustee
loans are not entirely convincing. The Securities and Exchange Commission's
finding that but a small portion of trustees were creditors of the obligor casts
doubt upon the indispensability of the lending privilege.s3 Anyway, if the de-
benture trustee suffers an appreciable loss of business from the denial of the
lending privilege, the additional fees such trustee may charge may be justifiable
in view of the added protection the investors will receive.34 The contention,
however, that allowing the trustee to lend to the obligor benefits the investor
seems cogent since the trustee may have handled the obligor's banking business
for many years and thus be the only bank with an interest in seeing that the
obligor will not fail because of default. Nevertheless, in view of the Cuba Cane
incident it is doubtful that merely sharing transfers made shortly before de-
fault gives a debenture holder sufficient protection.
Although the Trust Indenture Act does not provide for the removalS of a
trustee on the ground that it is a creditor, the notice requirements36 of the act
may raise the removal question since the trustee's reports of its status as cred-
itor of the obligor may indicate a conflict of interests. 37 Perhaps, in a situation
where a sufficient conflict is indicated, a court, in its discretion,38 may assert
the same power of removal over a corporate trustee as over an ordinary trustee.39
3o Ibid., at 89.
3% Ibid., at 91.
32 Wham, Trustees under Indentures, 23 A.B.AJ. 179, 181 (1937).
33 SEC, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. VI, at 123. Of 308 issues investigated, the trustee was a
creditor of the obligor within a year of default in nineteen instances. But see Posner, The Trus-
tee and the Trust Indenture: A Further Study, 46 Yale LJ. 737, 792 (1937).
34 See Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, 159 Misc. 57, 84, 287 N.Y. Supp.
54', 57, (S. Ct. 1936), where it was said: ...... It would be far better for the bondholders to
pay a much larger compensation to a trustee, and be able to insist upon the usual vigilance of a
fiduciary."
35 "Probably the most drastic preventive remedy available to the bondholder is removal of
the trustee," Posner, op. cit. supra note 33, at 777.
31 §§ 3r3(a)(2), (3), 3r3(b)(2).
37 Courts have recognized a conflict of interest in a trustee's being creditor of the obligor.
See, for example, Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, 159 Misc. 57, 63, 287
N.Y. Supp. 541, 548 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
38 Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 450, 102 Adt. 844 (1IM7).
39 Sargent v. Howe, 21 I1. 147 (x859); Whitev. Macqueen, 3601. 236, 195 N.E. 832 (1935);
see Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 NJ. Eq. 450, 467, 102 At. 844, 851 (1917). Contra:
Caldwell v. Hill, 179 Ga. 417, 176 S.E. 381 (1934).
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In such a case, any argument that the act by implication prohibits the removal
of the trustee is answered by the rule that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be strictly construed.
Ill
The extreme caution taken in drafting the "preferential collection" provision
of the act has resulted in a complicated formula of apportionment subject to
numerous exceptions where no apportionment is required.4° The complex shar-
ing of the "special account," required by Section 3ii(a), is to be
in such manner that the trustee and .... security holders realize, as a result of pay-
ments from such special account and .... dividends .... in bankruptcy or receiver-
ship or .... reorganization .... , the same percentage of their respective claims,
figured .... before crediting to the respective claims .... dividends .... in bank-
ruptcy or receivership or .... reorganization .... , but after crediting .... receipts
on .... their respective claims .... from all other sources ..... 41
In reorganization cases, however, the act permits the court to approve a fair
plan which represents only an approximate application of the formula.42 Al_
though in most cases the formula will result in a prorating of the "preferences"
between the security holders and trustee, instances may arise where because of
a mechanical application of the formula there will not be a strict prorating.43
Perhaps, to prevent any anomalous results, it may have been more suitable to
40 § 311.
4' § 311(a). 4' § 31i(a).
43 Suppose the following facts: a) a trustee of a qualified debenture issue of $i,ooo,ooo, b)
the trustee lends the obligor $r,ooo,ooo for which it takes a claim inferior to the debenture
claim, c) the trustee must account for a $4oo,ooo payment received from the obligor within
four months of default on the debenture, d) in bankruptcy the debenture holders receive $5oo,-
ooo because of their prior claim, and the trustee receives nothing.
If the rule required by Section 311 is strictly applied in this case, the trustee wil get all of
the special account of $400,o00, for the rule requires that, in apportioning the proceeds of the
special account so that each party will receive as nearly as possible the same percentage of his
respective claim, payments received in bankruptcy be credited toward the recipient's percent-
age. These latter payments, however, do not have to be shared; therefore the final percentages
may sometimes be unequal as in the instant case. The effect of such a distribution will be that
the priority of the security holders will be partially neutralized.
Nevertheless, it may be possible for a court confronted with the problem of this example to
construe this section so that the priority of the investor is preserved. To accomplish this re-
sult, the prior claim of the debenture holders could be, for the purpose of this section, a "se-
cured claim" and since "any payment with respect to the secured portion," of the recipient's
claim reduces its claim to that extent and is not included in determining the distribution of the
"special account," the trustee and security holders will share the "special account" of $400,-
ooo in the ratio of 2 to 1. See § 311(a).
The converse of the above example would be where the trustee has a prior claim as to which
the trustee tries to improve his position so that a "special account" is set up. The same diffi-
culty would arise as to the distribution of such a fund. Such a situation, however, is hard to
contemplate because many of the creditor relationships, in which the trustee could conceivably
have a priority, are exempted from the apportionment rule.
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have framed a general rule to govern the distribution of the "special account."44
The addition of such a rule, however, might cast doubt on the method of appor-
tionment in a situation where the present specific provisions properly cover the
case.
Another problem regarding the "special account" may arise where a guaran-
tor for the obligor pays the security holder's claim. The argument may then be
urged that the guarantor be subrogated to the rights of the security holders in
the "special account." It seems that if the reason for apportionment is to pre-
vent a loss to the security holders,45 such a claim to subrogation should be de-
nied.
It should be observed, however, that an arbitrary operation of the appor-
tionment rule is prevented where the same trustee is trustee under two or more
qualified indentures for the same obligor. In such an instance the "special ac-
count," required by the provisions of Section 3ii(a), is to be set up for the bene-
fit of all security holders four months before default on any of these indentures,
thereby preventing the holders of the issue first defaulting from sharing exclu-
sively with the trustee the funds or property in the "special account."46
Although the application of the apportioning rule is stated generally, many
qualifications limit it considerably.47 The first exception excludes "any ....
reduction [of the trustee's claim] resulting from .... the exercise of any right
of set-off which the trustee could have exercised if a petition in bankruptcy had
been filed by or against such obligor upon the date of such default."48 By incor-
porating this set-off rule, the act extends the bankruptcy rule49 that a bank may
44 Such a rule may be: the security holders and trustee are to share the "special account"
in proportion to their respective unsecured claims against the obligor, except that in case one
of the respective unsecured claims has a priority the "special account" shall be distributed so
that the priority is not wholly or partially defeated.
45 Section 302 states the "Necessity for Regulation." 46 § 3 1 (a).
47 § 3ii(a), (b). Subsection 311(c) amounts to an amendment of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935. The reason for the change was a case arising under the Holding Com-
pany Act, In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Co., Holding Co. Act Rel. i446 (1939). In that
case the commission so applied the act as to prevent the obligor of bonds from issuing an un-
secured note to the trustee of the bond issue as security for a loan by the trustee to the obligor.
The commission refused to consent to the giving of the note because if the note were issued to
the bond trustee, the trustee would be assuming the conflicting position of creditor of the ob-
ligor. It was immediately pointed out that such action by the SEC was equivalent to the pro-
hibition of the trustee's being a creditor of the obligor, a relationship not forbidden a trustee
under an indenture qualified under the Trust Indenture Act, H.R. Hearing on H.R. 2191 and
H.R. 5220, 76th Cong., ist Sess. 203 (1939). As a result, this last subsection, 3ri(c), was added
allowing an indenture trustee, though subject to the Holding Company Act, to become a cred-
itor of the obligor by the trustee's acquiring a security or note of the obligor. But the trustee
who becomes a creditor in this manner must agree to conform to the requirements set for a
trustee-creditor under an indenture qualified under the Trust Indenture Act.
41 § 311(a)(1).
49 For a criticism of the rule see McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the
Bankruptcy Act, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 369, 398 (i937).
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set off deposits made by an insolvent in the ordinary course of business within
four months of bankruptcy even where the bank knows of the debtor's in-
solvency.So This set-off rule will be important because the obligor-debtor will
usually be a depositor of the trustee. Furthermore, because it will be difficult
to show that a deposit by the obligor was made "out of the ordinary course of
business," a "preference" obtained in avoidance of Section 311 will not be easily
set aside.
One of the exceptions which has been discussed frequently is that allowing
the trustee to realize upon any property pledged simultaneously with any loan
made within the "preference period," providing the trustee sustains the burden
of proving it had no reasonable cause to believe a default under the indenture
would occur within four months.sx Although this exception is intended to allow
"rescue loans" to a limited extent, its critics assert that in effect such loans are
prohibited because "rescue loans" are given under such circumstances that the
lender cannot reasonably be sure the obligor will survive its financial difficul-
ties.52 It is further pointed out that putting the burden of proof as to reasonable
cause on the creditor is a harsh requirement and departs from the bankruptcy
rule on this question.53 Moreover, the critics argue that when a "rescue loan"
is needed the trustee is the only one concerned enough about the obligor to aid
it.s4 Thus, it has been suggested that the only requirement for a "rescue loan"
be a making in "good faith."s5
The retention of the restriction on "rescue loans" nevertheless seems justifi-
able. The act only restricts, but does not bar completely, the giving of "rescue
loans." And the trustee may, because of its position, have such knowledge of
the financial circumstances of the obligors6 that it will not be unduly burdened
in having to show reasonable cause.5 7 Admitting that the trustee is more help-
ful to the obligor in distress than another bank, without the requirement of
showing lack of "reasonable cause to believe that a default would occur within
four months" for a "rescue loan," a loan may be made simply to prolong the
obligor's existence in order to avoid any sharing of recent large payments or
collateral on loans. To lessen the requirement to "good faith," as suggested,
so New York County Nat'1 Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (i9o4); Gilbert's Collier, Bank-
ruptcy 1148 (Levi and Moore ed. 1937).
s' § 311(a)(C).
s2 S. Hearing on S. 477, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. 87, 202 (1939); H.R. Hearing on H.R. 2191
and H.R. 5220, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 16o (1939).
s3 S. Hearing on S. 477, 76th Cong., ist Sess. 87 (1939). See 52 Stat. 869 (1938), ix U.S.C.A.
§ 9 6a, b (Supp. 1939).
54 H.R. Hearing on H.R. 219i and H.R. 5220, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. 308 (ig39).
ss S. Hearing on S. 2344, 7 5th Cong., Ist Scss. 147 (1937); H.R. Hearing on H.R. 219x and
H.R. 5220, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. io 5 (1939).
S6 Posner, op. cit., supra note 32, at 792.
'7 See H.R. Hearing on H.R. 2191 and H.R. 5220, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 268 (1939).
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would again allow loans where the trustee felt there was merely a possibility of
success.
Another exception in the act allows a qualified indenture to exempt from the
operation of the apportioning rule certain listed advances which preserve the
trust property or remove prior liens.S8 This exemption, however, is permitted
only where the notice provisions in the indenture concerning such advances
have been followed. Coming within this category are such loans as those given
to finance repairs for "preserving the property," to pay insurance premiums, to
pay tax delinquencies, to pay rent defaults, and even to complete the building
mortgaged.s9 The policy in allowing a trustee to receive payments on such
claims free of sharing seems defensible since these loans by definition benefit the
bondholders, and further a priority will usually be given in bankruptcy. Never-
theless, in applying this exception, the courts should be careful not to extend it
to include loans which arguably benefit the investor but clearly do not tend to
have the effect of "preserving" the property subject to the lien of the inden-
ture. Thus, no "preference" exemption should be given loans made to avoid
an interest payment default which if it occurred would prevent the sale of un-
marketed securities.6 °
Although the apportionment rule of the act confers no discretion on the com-
mission, discretion is given to define "cash transaction" and "self-liquidating
paper" as used in two of the exceptions. 6 One exception permits a qualified in-
denture to exempt from the apportioning rule creditor relationships arising from
what is essentially a "cash transaction" between the trustee and obligor, as, for
example, where payment is by a check which may require a few days to clear;
the other exception exempts from the apportioning formula credits arising from
the acquisition of "self-liquidating paper" of the obligor, i.e., paper which will
be paid from the proceeds of the transaction out of which it arose.62
IV
The draftsmen of Section 311 have carefully attempted to prevent a circum-
vention of the section either by substituting collateral or by resignation. As a
result, where the trustee-creditor is allowed to realize on collateral held, an at-
tempt by the trustee to better secure himself by having the obligor substi-
s, § 311(b)(2).
59 Hallett v. Moore, 282 Mass. 380, 185 N.E. 474 (1933); 2 Jones, Bonds and Securities
§ 1042 (4th ed. 1935).
6o Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Hackett, Hoff & Thiermann, 213 Wis. 426, 434, 25o N.W. 866,
869 (1933); Coffey v. Lawman, 99 F. (2d) 245 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); Connell v. City of Kau-
kauna, 164 Wis. 471, 159 N.W. 927 (1917); First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v. Ricketts, 75 F.
(2d) 309 (C.C.A. 8th 1934). See also SEC, op. cit. supra note 4, pt. Ill, Committees for the
Holders of Real Estate Bonds 22-9, 75-85 (x936).
6 § 319(a) (2).
62 § 311(b)(4 ), (6); Rules T-x1B4, T-ixB6. General Rules and Regulations under the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, at 9 (194o).
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tute more valuable property is provided against by limiting the trustee's
realization on the latter collateral to the extent of the fair value of the original
security.3 Also, the trustee who resigns during the "preference period" is liable
as though no resignation had occurred.4 Moreover, a trustee who resigns with-
in four months of the "preference period" may not do what he otherwise would
be unable to do had he continued as trustee-creditor. Thus, a trustee who has
resigned is expressly brought within the "preferential collection" section, if the
receipt of property or reduction of claim, for which it would have had to account
had it remained as trustee, occurs within four months of default and within four
months after resignation.6s
Also foreseen was the attempt to evade the section through an exception
which permits the trust indenture to exempt from Section 311 (a) a credit arising
in favor of the trustee from disbursements as trustee or in any ministerial ca-
pacity in which it may serve the obligor.66 Evasion is prevented by restricting
the exemption to claims arising in "the ordinary course of business," thus ex-
cluding the trustee's lending to the obligor in the role of fiscal agent, in which
capacity it could arguably claim exemption from Section 311(a).
In spite of the care taken, however, some of the exceptions may be interpreted
to defeat the purpose of the section. The provision allowing the trustee to re-
tain "the proceeds of the bona fide sale of any such claim by the trustee to a
third person" is such an exception.6 7 Apparently the type of sale meant is one
made without the intent to circumvent the purpose of the section. But a plausi-
ble argument could be made that "bona fide" refers only to the purchaser. If
such a view is accepted the trustee bank can pass the claim on into the "regular
flow" with the result that the purchaser may improve his creditor status without
being subject to the indenture apportioning formula, and that the proceeds
which the trustee receives from the sale are also exempt. Or, it may be argued
that all that "bona fide" means is a "real" rather than "sham" sale. Under this
last view even a collusive sale will be upheld.
The other exception which may afford a "loophole" is one which permits the
exemption of a creditor relationship arising from ...... the ownership or ac-
quisition of securities issued under any indenture, or any security or securities
having a maturity of one year or more at the time of acquisition by the inden-
ture trustee.1 68 Although the suggestion that the period of maturity in the ex-
ception be reduced from a year to six months69 was apparently rejected to pre-
vent a circumvention of the section by six-month lending, it was not pointed
63 § 3i(a)(D); cf. Richardson v. Union Mortgage Co., 2i0 Iowa 346, 228 N.W. io3 (1929);
Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (S. Ct.
i936).
64 § 311(a). 65 § 311(a).
66 § 311(b)(3); S. Hearing on S. 2344, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 6i (i937).
6, § 3 1I(a)(A)(ii). 61 § 3 ii(b)(1).
69 S. Hearing on S. 2344, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 91 (1937).
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out that this provision sets up two classes of exemptions,70 namely: i) the
ownership or acquisition of securities under any indenture, and 2) the owner-
ship or acquisition of any security or securities having a maturity period of a
year or more at the time of acquisition by the indenture trustee. As the terms
"security"7' and "indenture"72 are defined in the act, the first class seems to
exempt a creditor relationship arising from a trustee's giving an unsecured
short-term loan in return for notes issued under an indenture. Moreover, by
the same interpretation, the trustee may give a secured loan knowing the obligor
will default within four months, providing the obligor follows the formality of
issuing notes for the debt under a mortgage. To prevent circumvention of Sec-
tion 311 through such interpretations of the above exceptions, it is submitted
that such terms as "bona fide," "security," and "indenture," should have been
more carefully defined by the act.
MEASURE OF RECOVERY AGAINST A PROMOTER WHO
SELLS PROPERTY TO A CORPORATION IN
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
It is not uncommon for a promoter to profit by selling property to the cor-
poration which he has organized. This profit may be made more or less secure
through the adoption of various financing techniques whereby the sale is made
at a time when the promoter and his affiliates are the sole shareholders. Inas-
much as all of the existing shareholders in the company may then be said to
have consented to the profit with full knowledge, the company is bound and
may not later rescind the sale or compel the promoter to disgorge his secret
profits. x In the absence of actionable deceitwhen these shares are later sold to the
70 The analysis of the Trust Indenture Act made by the SEC in H.R. Rep. ioi6, 76th
Cong., ist Sess. at 49 (1939), does not contradict such an interpretation.
71 The definition of the Securities Act of 1933 is used by the Act, § 303(I).
Section 2(I) of the Securities Act defines "security" as "any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond," etc., 48 Stat. 74 (i933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (Supp. 1939).
72 "The term 'indenture' means any mortgage, deed of trust, trust or other indenture ....
under which securities are outstanding or are to be issued, whether or not any property, real or
personal, is or is to be, pledged, mortgaged, assigned, or conveyed thereunder." § 3o3(i).
I There is a conflict of authority as to whether an action will lie in favor of the company
when there are later subscribers to new shares. One view, following Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 2o6 (i9o8), holds that there is no corporate right
of action even though, as part of the promotional scheme, these subscribers are contemplated.
There may, however, be individual actions for fraud. Cf. McCandess v. Furlaud, 296 U.S.
140 (1935). The other view, following Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v.
Bigelow, 203 Mass. i59, 89 N.E. 193 (igog), permits corporate action, holding that the fidu-
ciary duty runs to the corporation as the promoters intended to make it. See California-
Calaveras Mining Co. v. Walls, 170 Cal. 285, r49 Pac. 595 (1915); Hays v. The Georgian,
280 Mass. io, 18i N.E. 765 (1932); In re British Seamless Paper Box Co., 17 Ch. D. 467
(x8gi).
See generally, Ballantine, Corporations § 49 (r927); Stevens, Corporations i68 (1936);
i Fletcher, Cyc. Corporations § 194 (perm. ed. 1931).
